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in a Multispecies System
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Abstract   Spatial heterogeneity in multispecies systems affects both ecological
interactions and the composition of harvest. A bioeconomic model is used to
analyze the nonselective harvest of two stocks with generalized ecological inter-
action and different persistent distributions across two spatial strata. Harvester
response to aggregate effort controls is shown to partially dissipate rents rela-
tive to the case where the spatial distribution of effort can be specified.
Numerical solutions for time paths of spatial (first-best) and aggregate (second-
best) input constraints indicate factors affecting their relative efficiency. In the
scenarios studied, benefits of spatial specificity range from 0 to 15% of total net
present value (NPV), depending upon the spatial correlation of stocks, their
relative growth rates and prices, and the cost gradient across space. The ben-
efits of spatial regulation are also heightened by the presence of ecological
interaction, especially predator-prey dynamics.
Key words   Bycatch, multispecies system, second-best regulation, spatial
bioeconomic model.
JEL Classification Codes   Q20, Q22, Q28.
Introduction
Bioeconomic models of single, spatially homogeneous stocks (Clark 1990, chs. 2–3)
serve as the point of departure for more realistic and complex analyses. The canoni-
cal (and indeed, almost definitional) prescription for dynamic efficiency is that each
marginal unit of stock should be extracted if resulting current profits exceed its in
situ (or shadow) value; i.e., its discounted marginal contribution to the flow of fu-
ture rents. Those who actually make decisions about exploitation often fail to fully
internalize the forgone shadow value of the resource. Harvesters, therefore, extract
some units of biomass that should be left in situ, eroding dynamic rents along vari-
ous dimensions and—in the extreme of open-access—dissipating them altogether.
Regulations either explicitly constrain extractive inputs or outputs, or otherwise al-
ter incentives of harvesters (e.g., through output taxes or a market for harvest rights)
to better align them with those of society.
Dynamically efficient harvest of multiple stock resource systems can be compli-
cated by predator-prey relationships (Mesterton-Gibbons 1988; Chaudhuri and Saha
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Ray 1996; Mesterton-Gibbons 1996; Supriatna and Possingham 1999), transitions
between age classes (Anderson 1989), competition (Clark 1990, sec. 10.2), or canni-
balism (Armstrong and Sumaila 2001). These “ecological externalities” imposed by
one stock on the other(s) alter in situ values relative to those emerging from partial
equilibrium optimization. Decentralized management of individual stocks that ig-
nores such interactions achieves a lower level of dynamic rents in aggregate than a
“central planner” who optimizes subject to ecological interactions. For example, a
predator imposes a negative externality on its prey while the prey benefits the preda-
tor. Ceteris paribus, this increases the shadow value of prey biomass and decreases
that of predators; dynamically optimal harvest involves maintaining lower predator
biomass and more prey than under ecological independence.
When stocks interact, traversing one stock’s partial equilibrium optimal time
path causes other stocks to deviate from theirs (Mesterton-Gibbons 1988; Chaudhuri
and Saha Ray 1996; Mesterton-Gibbons 1996). The jointly efficient path may even
involve movement away from the steady-state optimum, relative to the starting stock
levels, en route to the final equilibrium (Ragozin and Brown 1985). Clark (1990,
sec. 10.2) characterizes optimal harvest of interdependent species; Mesterton-Gib-
bons (1988, 1996) solves for the singular control and describes the approach to
equilibrium for a generalized ecological interaction; Hoagland and Jin (1997) par-
tially solve the same generalized interacting-species case when one species has
extractive value and the other existence value.
Even when stocks are ecologically independent, nonselective effort links the dy-
namics of others through incidental harvest (“bycatch”). Analogous to ecological
relationships, technological linkages give rise to different optimal harvest policies
than those arising under perfect selectivity (Chaudhuri 1986, 1987; Mesterton-Gib-
bons 1987; Clark 1990).
When organisms are heterogeneously distributed in space, the location of har-
vest activity, as well as its overall intensity, influences efficiency. Biological
productivity may vary across space, causing in situ value to vary as well. Harvesters
have been shown empirically to respond to differences in expected rents when de-
ciding where and how intensively to operate (Eales and Wilen 1986; Hilborn and
Kennedy 1992). Ignoring this response of harvesters to profit gradients, for example
in the establishment of marine protected areas, leads to suboptimal results (Smith
and Wilen 2003).
Numerous studies consider the exploitation of metapopulations comprising two
or more sub-populations, or patches, in discrete space. These models take into ac-
count the dynamics of sub-populations as well as the transfer of organisms between
patches when describing, or optimizing with respect to, the spatial distribution of
harvest activity. An emergent rule of thumb is that, ceteris paribus,1 areas with rela-
tively high intrinsic growth rates (i.e., net sources of biomass) should be harvested
less aggressively than net sinks (Tuck and Possingham 1994). Source-sink relation-
ships may be due to biological factors; e.g., differential fecundity or mortality rates,
or physical ones; e.g., advective dispersal or space limitations (Brown and
Roughgarden 1997).
Sanchirico and Wilen (1999) develop a dynamic model of effort and stock levels
in a metapopulation in which effort evolves in response to profit gradients. They as-
sume rent dissipation at equilibrium, and therefore do not consider efficient spatial
1 In particular, assuming homogeneous harvest costs across space. When there is a cost gradient that
runs counter to the flow of biomass in a system, it is not unequivocal that one should protect the net
sources of biomass and focus exploitation on the net sinks of biomass. Political or management costs of
closing productive areas may also be high, which should be factored into policy design (Sanchirico and
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policy per se. Their subsequent analysis solves for dynamically efficient spatial
management, which entails a spatial tax on harvest equal to the shadow value at
each point in space (Sanchirico and Wilen 2005). Spatial management necessarily
outperforms that which ignores spatial structure.
Though the interplay between ecological interaction and spatial structure has
not been well studied, these two characteristics are likely to coexist in many actual
systems. In Supriatna and Possingham (1999), optimal harvest of a two-patch,
predator-prey metapopulation consists of a constant escapement policy that depends
upon dispersal rates and the strength of ecological interactions. Their model as-
sumes perfect selectivity; i.e., the ability to choose escapement of each species in
each patch independently.
The model presented here combines spatial structure and ecological interaction
in the context of nonselective effort. The analysis includes the impact of spatial dis-
tribution of effort on the catch composition, and therefore on evolution of the stocks
and dynamic efficiency. First-best regulation,2 with an optimal level of effort chosen
at each point in space and time, is compared to the second-best case, in which the
regulator is unable to directly control spatial effort allocation but does so indirectly
by optimizing subject to the expected response of harvesters.
Bioeconomic Model
The system in question consists of two technologically and ecologically linked
stocks. Biomass of each stock i = 1,2 at time t is denoted by the scalar Xit. The spa-
tial distribution of stock i across discrete spatial strata 1 and 2 is captured by the
row vector3 Xit = (xi1t, xi2t). The binomial distribution of each stock i is represented
by the vector Ci = (ci1, ci2) satisfying ci1 = 1 – ci2, so that Xit = XitCi. Spatial distribu-
tions are assumed constant, regardless of the biomass of the stocks, which
redistribute themselves at the beginning of each time period t so as to restore the
spatial proportions Ci.4 The sign of spatial stock correlation is that of (0.5 – c11)(0.5
– c21). If stocks are perfectly correlated across space; i.e., if Ci = Cj, spatial distribu-
tion of effort has no impact on its selectivity, catch composition is then determined
entirely by the relative catchability coefficients of the two stocks and their total
abundance.
The harvest industry consists of a large number of agents who act according to
the tenets of regulated open access (Homans and Wilen 1997). Harvesters act in a
decentralized fashion to maximize current private profits without regard for their
2 This scenario gives a “first-best” outcome subject to the nonselective harvest technology; presumably
an even more efficient approach path could be achieved if effort were perfectly selective.
3 Vector notation is used where possible. Boldface characters represent row vectors (and their transpose
column vectors); parameters defined across space (strata), such as a particular stock’s spatial distribu-
tion or space-specific wage levels, are given in row format, and those indexed by stock, such as prices
or catchability coefficients, are given in column format. Plain-text uppercase variables or parameters ap-
ply to both species or to both strata; and lower-case variables are specific to one species in a single loca-
tion.
4 Constant proportionality arises if the organisms assort according to habitat quality, and the habitat
qualities (with respect to a particular stock i) in the two strata have the same intercept, but different
slopes. That is, suppose the habitat quality inhabited by the marginal unit of stock i in each stratum m
declines according to qim =  ai – bimxim as biomass increases. Organisms will settle in two strata m and n
so as to equalize habitat quality on the margin. This gives rise to the condition xim = (bim/bin)xin, which, in
turn, implies a constant fraction cim = bin/bim of stock i in stratum m. This assumption simplifies the dy-
namics of this system (necessitating two state variables rather than four). Implications of the constant
proportionality assumption, and the potential effect of relaxing it, are discussed in the conclusions.Herrera 66
impact on future stock levels. This is tantamount to assuming an infinite discount
rate on the part of harvesters.5
Harvesters exert nonselective extractive effort Ft = (f1t, f2t) across space at time
t, with catchability coefficients Q = (q1, q2)T constant across strata. Marginal cost of
effort varies over space according to wage vector W = (w1, w2). Marginal harvest is
linear in effort and stock as in the standard Schaefer model; i.e., dh = qx(df). Corre-
spondingly, as in Homans and Wilen (1997), harvest depletes stocks within a time
period: dximt/dfmt = –qiximt, with a corresponding decline in the marginal productivity
of effort.6 Starting with biomass ximt in stratum i before time t harvest, the escape-
ment subsequent to exertion of effort fmt is:
simt(ximt, fmt) = ximte-qi fmt , (1)
and harvest is:
himt(ximt, fmt)= ximt - simt(ximt, fmt)= ximt(1-e-qi fmt ). (2)
Hit is the spatial harvest vector of stock i and Sit the corresponding escapement:
Sit = Xit – Hit. Aggregate escapement of stock i is the scalar Sit.
Harvested biomass of both stocks sells in perfectly competitive markets, with
price vector P = (p1, p2)T constant across time. Current-period rents associated with
effort vector Ft are:
P(X1t,X2t,Ft) = TR(X1t,X2t, Ft) – TC(Ft) = pihimt(ximt, fmt)
m å
i å – W • Ft, (3)
where the ‘•’ operator is the inner (dot) product of the two vectors.
Subject to harvest, each stock evolves in discrete time according to a logistic
growth function modified by local ecological interaction:
Xi(t+1) = Sit + Ci • Gi(Sit, S jt), (4)
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Intrinsic growth rate of species i is ri, and Ki are carrying capacities vis-à-vis total
biomass. Parameters aji denote the nature and magnitude of ecological impact of
stock j on stock i. For example, aji > 0, aij < 0 depicts a predator-prey relationship
(stocks i and j, respectively), and aji < 0, aij < 0 competition.
Figure 1 shows a schematic of the system, including depletion of stock (from its
5 Admittedly, this is not always an accurate characterization of the harvest industry. If an individual har-
vester constitutes a significant portion of the fleet, and if their tenure in the industry is likely to last into
the future (due to legal entitlements or large capital investments which give them a competitive edge
over other potential entrants), the harvester will internalize at least some portion of their dynamic im-
pact on the stock; i.e., they will act as though they have a finite discount rate. The assumption of har-
vesters acting entirely in the present is appropriate for cases where a highly elastic labor force partici-
pates in an industry whose costs are mostly variable.
6 or, equivalently, a rising marginal cost of output within a season.Spatial Regulation of Multiple Species 67
initial level to escapement) as a result of harvest. In each time period, escapement of
each stock in each stratum gives rise to a gross productivity7—the first component
of the first term on the RHS of equation (5)—and then stocks interact within strata
(the second component of this term). The net productivity is converted into adult
biomass in the subsequent period via a density-dependent process, with density ex-
pressed as the ratio between total escapement (across both strata) and the stock’s
total carrying capacity. After recruitment into the aggregate biomass, stocks re-as-
sort themselves spatially according to their respective distribution vectors Ci to give
rise to the spatial stock vectors in the subsequent period.8
Dynamic Optimization with Spatially Structured Control
In the “first-best” case, the regulator specifies both elements of the spatial effort
vector Ft at each time t so as to maximize the present value of rents9 arising from the
system. The Bellman equation for the associated dynamic programming problem
over an infinite time horizon is:
V(X1t,X2t,F t) = max P(X1t, X2t, Ft)
+ bV [X1(t + 1)( X1t, X2t, Ft), X2(t + 1)( X1t, X2t, Ft)], (6)
7 Separate ecological interactions take place within each stratum as a function of the respective portions
of the two stocks present.
8 A further clarification of the stock dynamics: Ecological interaction takes place within strata, follow-
ing harvest (i.e., it is a function of escapements). Stocks from both strata then “pool” in some location
(e.g., a breeding ground) at the start of each season. Reproduction takes place subsequent to density-
dependent effects (e.g., from limited food or substrate on the breeding grounds). Biomass then redistrib-
utes itself, in time-invariant proportions, to the fishing grounds. Biomass does not flow between strata
(fishing grounds) during the harvest season. While this depiction of stock dynamics is adopted, in part,
as a simplifying assumption, it is also a reasonable representation of reality for stocks which migrate
each year to a remote location to reproduce.
9 Future rents are discounted by the factor b = 1/(1 + d), where d is the discount rate.
Figure 1.  Schematic of the Dynamics of a Representative SpeciesHerrera 68
subject to the equations of motion (4), the initial conditions:
X1,0 = X1
0; X2,0 = X2
0, (7)
element-by-element non-negativity constraints on the state and control vectors:
Xit ³ 0; (8)
Fit ³ 0; i = 1,2, (9)
and the aggregate harvest capacity constraint:
fmt
m å £ Fmax. (10)
In theory, this problem can be solved by substituting equations (4) into the RHS of
equation (6). First-order conditions would then set the derivatives of the RHS of
equation (6) with respect to the two effort levels to zero. The Benveniste-
Scheinkman condition (Sargent 1987) would result from differentiating equation (6)
with respect to the state variables. This latter condition, together with the first-order
condition, would give rise to a time-consistent harvest policy dependent only upon
the state variables, assuming the value function converges10 (Lucas, Stokey, and
Prescott 1989). By inspection, however, it seems this protocol is unlikely to yield
analytical results, given the nonlinearity in the growth function and the ecological
and technical linkages between the stocks. Instead, this problem is solved using nu-
merical methods, as discussed below.
Aggregate Effort Control
Complete specification of the spatial effort distribution requires both fixed (e.g., an
initial investment in technology) and variable (e.g., monitoring) costs and therefore
may not be feasible or cost effective. If spatial effort control is prohibitively costly
or unenforceable, the regulator must resort to a “blunt” regulatory instrument.
Though there are other possibilities, the blunt control considered here is an aggre-
gate effort constraint; i.e., a limit on the total effort exerted across all strata.
Optimal aggregate effort control takes place as a two-stage game.11 To characterize
the solution to this game, it is necessary to first describe the outcome of the second
stage; i.e., the response of harvesters to an aggregate effort constraint. Incorporating
this response as a constraint, the regulator then chooses a time path of aggregate ef-
fort so as to achieve the highest possible NPV. Inability to choose effort levels
separately renders this approach second-best relative to spatially specific regulation.
10 In fact, in the numerical solution to this problem, the value function converges for a sufficiently long
time horizon, yielding a time-invariant, state-dependent numerical policy function.
11 Spatially structured and aggregate effort controls are not the only instruments regulators are likely to
have at their disposal. A number of other regulatory instruments, such as trip limits and size limits, are
commonly employed to elicit changes in catch compositions. Quotas (transferable or otherwise) or taxes
on landed biomass could also be used. The analysis here could be carried out with a focus on quotas or
prices rather than input restrictions.Spatial Regulation of Multiple Species 69
The Harvesters’ Problem
The marginal net benefit of effort applied to stratum m depends upon the starting stocks
in that stratum, the amount of effort already applied, and economic parameters:
MNB(x1mt, x2mt, fmt) = piqicimxite-q ifmt - wm
i å . (11)
Harvesters respond to an aggregate effort allotment  F t  at time t by allocating mar- -
ginal effort quanta12 to the more lucrative stratum until the constraint binds. An
interior outcome, with positive effort in both strata, consists of a vector of effort
levels  ˜  F  t(F  t) = { f(F  t), f(F  t)} satisfying an equimarginal net benefit condition:
MNB(x11t, x21t, f1t) = MNB(x12t, x22t, f 2t), (12)
and the regulatory constraint:13
fmt £ Ft
m å . (13)
A corner solution with all effort focused in stratum m (i.e.,  ˜  f  mt = Ft ) arises if the
marginal net benefit of effort in stratum m, after all allowed effort  F t has been ex-
erted there, exceeds that of effort in stratum n before any effort has been exerted;
i.e., if:
MNB(x1mt, x2mt, Ft ) ³ MNB(x1nt, x2nt, 0). (14)
The Regulator’s Second-best Problem
Limited to an aggregate control, the regulator incorporates the reaction of the har-
vesters into a problem analogous to equation (6), but with a single scalar control
variable,  F t:
V(X1t,X2t) = max
F  t
P X1t, X2t, ˜  F  t(F  t ) [ ] (15)
+bV X 1(t+1) X1t, X2t, ˜  F  t(F  t) [ ], X2(t+1) X1t, X2t, ˜  F  t(F  t) [ ] { }.
Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between the first-best and second-best solu-
tions in a given time period using isoprofit curves for the principal and agent. The
principal’s (regulator’s) isoprofit14 lines are drawn as concentric ellipses surround-
12 Note that the outcome of the harvesters is not a coordinated optimization per se over the total effort
levels in the two strata. Rather, it is the aggregate result of the successive allocation of effort quanta
across space, where each quantum is allocated to the location where it yields the highest profits.
13 The regulatory constraint is nonbinding only if MNB(x11t, x21t, ˜  f  1t ) = MNB(x12t, x22t, ˜  f  2t ) = 0 with equa-
tion (13) satisfied as an inequality. There is, however, no reason for the regulator to issue a nonbinding
aggregate effort constraint.
14 These are really better described as “iso-dynamic-profit,” or “iso-NPV” curves, as they take into ac-
count all future rents emerging from the system rather than just the current payoff.Herrera 70
ing the point ‘*’. This first-best effort pairing  {f 1
*, f2
*} corresponds to the spatially
structured controls that maximize dynamic rents; i.e., the solution to equations (6)–
(10) where the future value function is known. Social NPV declines moving radially
outward in any direction from the optimum.
In the second-best solution, the regulator specifies the aggregate effort con-
straint  F, which corresponds to a linear regulatory frontier with a slope of –1.
Barring corner solutions, harvesters divide the aggregate effort allowance among the
strata so that the marginal profitability of effort is equal. This corresponds to a point
of tangency between an isoprofit curves ph and the regulatory constraint, such as
points A and B in figure 2. The expansion path EPh traces out the response of har-
vesters to varying aggregate effort constraints. The regulator then chooses the
aggregate effort constraint with the harvester response that yields the highest level
of dynamic social rents.
In the scenario pictured in figure 2, the highest dynamic social rents attainable
in the second-best solution emerge with aggregate effort  F
B, which gives rise to
harvester response  {˜  f  1
B, ˜  f  2
B}. This second-best solution involves too little effort in
stratum 1 and too much in stratum 2, relative to the first-best solution.
Figure 2.  Comparison of First-best and Second-best Solutions
Note: Points A and B, harvester responses to aggregate effort constraints  F
A
 and  F
B
,
are on the second-best expansion path EPh, and ‘*’ is the first-best outcome.Spatial Regulation of Multiple Species 71
Numerical Results
A numerical dynamic programming routine was used to solve for the rent-maximiz-
ing effort and stock paths over a finite time horizon, using backward induction.15
Such paths were derived both for the case of spatially structured effort, solving
equations (6)–(10), and aggregate effort control; i.e., solving equation (15).
Comparative Statics
The “base parameter set” (BPS) of table 1 was chosen, fairly arbitrarily, for pur-
poses of comparison. It depicts two ecologically independent stocks with moderate
negative spatial correlation: 30% of stock 1 and 70% of stock 2 is in stratum 1.
Stock 1 has a higher intrinsic growth rate and a lower ex-vessel price than stock 2.
Carrying capacities are equal. The marginal cost of effort in stratum 2 is higher than
that in stratum 1.
The first-best steady-state stocks and controls, emerging from the solution to
equations (6)–(10), are given in table 2. The first row (Scenario 1) corresponds to
the BPS; subsequent rows give results for the indicated parameter changes. Com-
parisons of equilibrium stock and effort levels for this collection of parameter
changes largely corroborate economic intuition.
Increasing the discount rate from d = 0.03 to d = 0.06 (Scenario 2) leads to
higher steady-state effort levels in both strata, as well as a decrease in both stock
15 A terminal condition of zero salvage value was used in the computations here. This could be replaced
with a positive salvage value function, such as a linear salvage function (i.e., constant value per unit
stock remaining in the terminal period), some concave function, etc. Some exploratory solutions to the
model with non-zero salvage value were used to determine that, while the behavior toward the end of
the time horizon is affected by the salvage value assumption, the steady-state levels of biomass and con-
trols are not affected for sufficiently long time horizons. Because the numerical solution is an approxi-
mation to an infinite-horizon problem in which the system would remain at this steady-state in perpetu-
ity, the salvage value assumption does not seem to be of much consequence.
Table 1
Base Parameter Set (BPS)
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levels. A higher rate of return elsewhere makes it efficient to substitute out of biom-
ass and into other forms of capital. This change is analogous to the standard
single-stock optimal control results in which steady-state stock decreases and effort
increases with the discount rate.16
Scenario 3 examines the effects of an increase in the intrinsic growth rate of
stock 1 and a decrease in that of stock 2. Because stock 1 is concentrated in stratum
2 and vice-versa, this shift in reproductive rates leads to increased effort in stratum
2 and decreased effort in stratum 1. Steady-state biomass levels move in the same
direction as the growth rates.
In Scenario 4, both wage rates increase, but at different rates. Effort shifts away
from stratum 1, which becomes relatively more expensive to exploit. The effects on
effort and steady-state biomass in stratum 2 are ambiguous. In Scenario 5, there is
no such ambiguity: Stratum 2 becomes less expensive to harvest in both an absolute
and a relative sense. Changing relative output prices (Scenario 6) has an effect simi-
lar (but opposite in direction) to that of changing wages.
Ecological interactions also alter the first-best steady-state. The regulator takes
into account the effect of interspecific dynamics on the shadow values of stocks and
the variation in these effects over space according to the spatial distributions of the
species. Relative to the ecologically independent case, the presence of a predator-
prey relationship (Scenario 7) makes it efficient to harvest more intensively where
the predator is concentrated and less so in the stratum preferred by the prey. Eco-
logical competition (Scenario 8), on the other hand, acts as a sort of depreciation.
Much like a discount rate, it prompts substitution out of both stocks into other forms
of capital; effort is increased and standing stocks decreased in both strata.
Comparative Dynamics and NPV Comparisons
Numerical solution of the first- and second-best dynamic programming problems al-
lows for comparative dynamic analysis, as well as computation of differences in
NPV over the entire time horizon. Given the dimensionality of the parameter space,
it is not feasible to exhaustively describe the impacts of different parameter combi-
nations on dynamic behavior. Rather, a few representative scenarios of interest are
discussed. The focus is on cases where spatial regulation is likely to be most impor-
tant; i.e., where the incentives of harvesters seeking current profits conflict most
strongly with the social objective of maximizing dynamic rents.
Inversely Related Growth Rates and Prices
Suboptimal use of resources often results when a stock has a low growth rate but a
high ex vessel price. Like non-renewable resources, slow-growing, high-priced
stocks give rise to high marginal in situ rents when managed optimally, and are
hence prone to over-exploitation under open access. Examples of such stocks are the
Pacific grenadier (Coryphaenoides acrolepis); Patagonian toothfish (Dissostichus
eleginoides), marketed as “Chilean sea bass; and orange roughy (Hoplostethus
atlanticus).
The dynamic efficiency of spatial and non-spatial regulation was compared for
various combinations of growth rates (r2) and prices (p2) for stock 2. Table 3 shows
16 Specifically, from the canonical Gordon-Schaefer model solved with optimal control, x* = (K/2)(r –  d)/r
and E* = (r + d)/2q.Herrera 74
relative NPV gains from spatial control, in percentage terms, associated with these
parameter combinations.17 Benefits of spatial control increase for all growth rates as
p2 increases. In general, NPV gain also increases as the growth rate of X2 declines,
though at very low levels (e.g., r2 = 0.10) NPV gain declines slightly due to the di-
minished contribution of X2, in percentage terms, to overall NPV.
Figure 3 shows stock and effort trajectories for spatial and aggregate control in
the scenario r2 = 0.15, p2 = 30; i.e., for an X2 that is slow-growing and high-priced
relative to the BPS. Aggregate control leads to depletion of X2 below the level
emerging from the first-best solution; the second-best solution involves more effort
in stratum 1, where X2 is concentrated, than in stratum 2. In the first-best solution,
more effort is exerted in stratum 2 than in stratum 1 at all points in time.
Interaction of Ecological Linkages and Spatial Correlation
When stocks are heterogeneously distributed in space, ecological interactions can
amplify the divergence between the performance of spatial and aggregate controls.
For example, consider the case of a predator-prey interaction, where X1 is the preda-
tor and X2 the prey. Under spatial control, the social planner will account for the
negative externality imposed by X1 on X2 by increasing the amount of effort exerted
in the location(s) where X1 is concentrated and decreasing effort where X2 is concen-
trated. Under aggregate control, no such direct adjustment is possible. Therefore,
dissipation of rents due to suboptimal spatial effort allocation is exacerbated by the
presence of the interaction.
Table 4 reports NPV gains from spatial control as a function of both the strength
of ecological interaction and the degree of negative spatial correlation of the
stocks. Assuming (as in the BPS) X1 is concentrated in stratum 2 and X2 in stra-
tum 1,  a range of negative spatial correlations is represented by the single
Table 3
NPV Gains (%) from Spatial Regulation for Different Growth Rates and Prices of Stock 2
p2
10 15 20 25 30
0.10 0.51 2.29 4.38 7.07 9.37
0.15 0.78 3.18 6.50 9.76 12.73
r2 0.20 0.73 3.23 6.38 9.59 11.61
0.25 0.56 2.84 5.67 7.75 9.32
0.30 0.43 2.27 4.60 6.12 7.33
Note: Other parameters are as in the base parameter set of table 1.
17 The gains from spatial control vary depending on the starting stock levels; i.e., DNPV = f(x1
0, x2
0). For
example, spatial control is more beneficial when the stock of a slow-growing, valuable stock is initially
depleted. The numbers presented in this and subsequent tables are the maximum NPV gains across all
possible starting stock levels.Spatial Regulation of Multiple Species 75
parameter Dc Î {0.1, 0.2, 0.3}. Spatial distribution vectors C1 = (0.5 – Dc, 0.5 +
Dc), C2 = (0.5 + Dc, 0.5 – Dc) are considered for each of the Dc. Panel (a) reports the
results for a predator-prey relationship (stock 1 the predator, stock 2 the prey), and
(b) a competitive relationship (both interaction coefficients negative).
Under both predator-prey and competitive ecological interactions, the impor-
tance of spatial control generally increases with the strength of the ecological
interaction and with the degree of negative spatial correlation. There is some con-
cavity in the benefits of spatial control; i.e., a differential of 12.75% for a
predator-prey relationship of ± 0.0035 and Dc = 0.2, and only 10.57% when Dc =
0.3.
The benefits of spatial control are larger in the case of predator-prey relation-
ships than in the case of competition, ceteris paribus. Competing stocks impose
reciprocal negative externalities, so it is efficient to increase harvest intensity in
general. The decline in NPV under aggregate effort control comes from not fully ad-
justing intensity of harvest to emphasize areas where the interaction is greatest. In a
predator-prey scenario, the prey imposes a positive externality on the predator, while
the predator’s effect on the prey is negative. Myopic incentives, which cause har-
vesters to harvest too much prey and not enough predators are, therefore, doubly
detrimental to NPV in the predator-prey case.
Figure 3.  Stock and Effort Trajectories, under Spatial and Aggregate Control, for a
High-priced, Slow-growing Stock 2 (r2 = 0.15, p2 = 30)Herrera 76Spatial Regulation of Multiple Species 77
Conclusions
The importance of curtailing the intensity of extractive effort in common-pool re-
sources is well understood. The existing literature emphasizes the tendency of
harvesters, under open access, to ignore some or all of the in situ value of standing bio-
mass. Therefore, they exert too much effort, partially or fully dissipating social rents.
The current analysis demonstrates that in resources with heterogeneous spatial distribu-
tions, space can provide an additional dimension along which harvesters dissipate rents.
Technology that improves the regulator’s ability to dictate the location of effort as well
as its intensity can, therefore, increase dynamic rents. Aggregate, or blunt, constraints on
the quantity of harvest effort18 are suboptimal (second-best), because harvesters perceive
homogeneous market value while the shadow value of extracted stock is in fact hetero-
geneous. It is impossible to compel harvesters to fully internalize spatial variations
in shadow values with an instrument that does not itself have spatial resolution.
Regulation that incorporates spatial structure, like any instrument that reduces
the information deficit of the regulator, can significantly increase the efficiency of
resource use. Scientific understanding of the spatial dimension of biological and
economic processes is improving, and technology for spatial monitoring of agent be-
havior at high resolution is increasingly available (Wilen 2004). Indeed, if large
fishes (sharks) themselves can be tracked accurately through space and time (Klimley et
al. 2001), it should be feasible to track the spatial deployment of fishing vessels and
gear. Such technologies are, however, costly; the decision whether to incorporate a spa-
tial dimension into a regulatory instrument depends upon the magnitude of these costs
relative to efficiency gains. Without considering the costs of spatial monitoring and en-
forcement, the current analysis provides a framework in which to assess the
magnitude of efficiency gains associated with adding a spatial dimension to regula-
tions. General qualitative results emerge regarding the attributes of a multispecies
system that make spatial regulation more or less beneficial. For example, spatially
structured effort regulations are less likely to justify costs of implementation when
stocks are well correlated over space or when the rate of discount is high.
The analysis revolves around a multispecies bioeconomic model with general-
ized ecological interactions. Each stock has a unique binomial distribution across
space; the fractions of a given stock in each of the strata are constant in time. The
same nonselective harvest technology is employed in both strata. The spatial distri-
bution of effort, therefore, interacts with stock distributions to determine the catch
composition; i.e., the ratio of different species in the overall harvest.
The second-best scenario, in which only aggregate effort can be controlled, con-
stitutes a dynamic principal-agent problem: In each period, a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium is obtained by deriving the harvesters’ response (consisting of a spatial
distribution of effort levels). This response is then incorporated into the social
planner’s optimization problem.
The model presented here employs a fairly stringent assumption regarding the
spatial dynamics of the stock; i.e., that the stocks are distributed in time-invariant
proportions across the spatial strata at the start of each period. Even though harvest
differentially depletes the stocks locally, stock dynamics presume stocks pool and
are subsequently redistributed each period so as to maintain these spatial propor-
tions. This assumption is arguably less realistic than metapopulation models, such as
those employed by Sanchirico and Wilen (1999, 2005), in which substocks evolve
separately. In a two-species, two-patch metapopulation model, however, there are
18 In the context of a spatially structured effort, this quantity dimension of harvest effort refers to the
sum of the elements of the spatial harvest vector.Herrera 78
four state variables rather than two over which to optimize, making computation of
optimal control paths more difficult. Aside from expedience in this sense, the formu-
lation presented here has another advantage; it allows for an assessment of the effect
of differential spatial correlation per se on the benefits of spatial control, without
the need to consider dynamic changes in such spatial correlation.
Numerical analysis was used to explore the relationship between biological and
economic parameters and the gains from implementing depth-specific regulation.
Some substantial gains from spatial management—as high as a 15% increase in
NPV—were found in the scenarios examined, and the sample of parameter sets ex-
plored was not exhaustive. It is likely there are other parameter sets for which the
gains are larger than those reported here.
Spatial regulation is found to be particularly beneficial when one of the stocks
is slow growing and high priced. When such stocks are optimally managed, they are
maintained at a level where their in situ value is high relative to faster-growing
stocks. Because aggregate (non-spatial) effort constraints give harvesters an oppor-
tunity to partially disregard this high shadow value of such stocks, the efficiency
losses associated with a blunt instrument are especially high.
A key result of this paper is the effect of ecological interactions, in particular
predator-prey and competitive relationships, on the benefits of spatially structured
regulation. These interactions take place within the strata, after the harvest process,
as a modification of pre-recruitment larval production. Because such interactions are
proportional to local stock abundances, the spatial pattern of harvest affects the in-
terspecific dynamics and, in turn, the in situ value of stocks.
For example, from a social standpoint it is optimal to harvest more intensively in
areas of high density of both stocks when there are strong competitive interactions, or in
areas with relatively high concentrations of a predator in the case of a predator-prey in-
teraction. If harvesters act myopically in pursuit of current profits, they do not account
for such interactions in their decisions about where or how much to harvest. Ecological
interaction is, therefore, another locus of rent dissipation. Numerical results presented
here suggest that both predator-prey and competitive interactions magnify the benefits of
spatially structured controls, though asymmetry of the externality in the predator-prey
case makes spatial regulation even more important.
The dynamic programming technique used to determine optimal time path of ef-
fort could be modified to include stochastic growth or spatial dynamics or spatial
distributions that follow a density-dependent process. Most existing literature deal-
ing  with  joint  harvest  of  multiple  species  assumes  stocks  are  evenly  and
deterministically mixed at each point in time; it would be more realistic to model
the degree of mixing as a stochastic variable. The methods above could be used to
determine when and whether this extension to stochastic harvest composition is
likely to matter for either single-pool or spatially structured resources.
Spatially structured multispecies resources provide a new set of theoretical chal-
lenges. When the regulator is able to specify only the magnitude of extractive
inputs, but not their spatial allocation, spatial structure introduces asymmetries of
information not present in single-pool resources. Spatially structured regulations
provide a means of improving the selectivity of harvest and mitigating the partial
dissipation of social rents resulting from this informational asymmetry. This paper
provides a methodology for assessing the benefits associated with such regulations.
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